SALUS SECURITY

OCT 2024

CODE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

LORENZO PROTOCOL

Overview

Project Summary

- Name: Lorenzo Protocol - FBTC-Vault
- Platform: EVM-compatible chains
- Language: Solidity
- Repository:
    - https://github.com/Lorenzo-Protocol/FBTC_Vault
- Audit Range: See Appendix - 1

Project Dashboard

Application Summary

Name	Lorenzo Protocol - FBTC-Vault
Version	v2
Type	Solidity
Dates	Oct 29 2024
Logs	Oct 28 2024; Oct 29 2024

Vulnerability Summary

Total High-Severity issues	0
Total Medium-Severity issues	0
Total Low-Severity issues	1
Total informational issues	2
Total	3

Contact

E-mail: support@salusec.io

Risk Level Description

High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to a moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or defense in depth.

Content

Introduction

1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.

We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (https://t.me/salusec), Twitter (https://twitter.com/salus_sec), or Email (support@salusec.io).

1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication

1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

Findings

2.1 Summary of Findings

ID	Title	Severity	Category	Status
1	Centralization risk	Low	Centralization	Acknowledged
2	Non-standard error types	Informational	Code Quality	Resolved
3	Missing two-step transfer ownership pattern	Informational	Business Logic	Acknowledged

2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.

1. Centralization risk

Severity: Low	Category: Centralization
Target: - contracts/FBTC_Vault.sol	

Description

There is an `owner` privileged account in the `FBTC_Vault` contract, and the `owner` can change the value of the `lockedFBTC` variable in the contract at will. If `owner`'s private key is compromised, an attacker can change `lockedFBTC` to his own address and thus extract all the FBTCs in the contract.

This could be worrisome if the privileged account is a regular EOA account.

Recommendation

We recommend transferring privileged accounts to multi-sig accounts with timelock governors for enhanced security. This ensures that no single person has full control over the accounts and that any changes must be authorized by multiple parties.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

2.3 Informational Findings

2. Non-standard error types

Severity: Informational	Category: Code Quality
Target: - contracts/FBTC_Vault.sol	

Description

contracts/FBTC_Vault.sol:L115 - L130

```
function withdrawNativeBTC() external whenNotPaused onlyLorenzoAdmin {
    if (lockedFBTC == address(0)) {
        revert InvalidParam();
    }
    ...
}
```

There is no parameter passing in the `withdrawNativeBTC` function, but the `InvalidParam` error is used in the function, which can lead to errors in interpreting the error message.

Recommendation

It is recommended to use more contextual error types such as `UninitializedLockedFBTC` etc.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit b95ccd7.

3. Missing two-step transfer ownership pattern

Severity: Informational	Category: Business logic
Target: - contracts/FBTC_Vault.sol	

Description

The `FBTC_Vault` contract inherits from the `OwnableUpgradeable` contract. This contract does not implement a two-step process for transferring ownership. Thus, ownership of the contract can easily be lost when making a mistake in transferring ownership.

Recommendation

Consider using the Ownable2StepUpgradeable contract from OpenZeppelin instead.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

Appendix

Appendix 1 - Files in Scope

This audit covered the following files in commit ce369b3:

File	SHA-1 hash
contracts/FBTC_Vault.sol	b394ef3becc7cc38bb2be7c601c4db1b051d2572